What is the influence on reference price when the source of price information is anonymous versus social? This article investigates the formation of reference prices given an observed sequence of past prices in a service context. An experimental study suggests that, considering the same price information, if the source is social (i.e., the prices paid by colleagues), then consumers want to pay less. More specifically, social comparison changes the way individuals weigh information, attributing more importance to the lowest historical prices and to the range in price variations.
Introduction
Imagine you want to book a hotel room. Some weeks in advance, you check prices on the Internet. Because of dynamic pricing practices, you are accustomed to seeing variability every time you check for a price. To judge whether the offered price is a "fair deal", you recall past prices you might have seen or paid for this or a similar service. Alternately, friends or colleagues may have informed you of how much they paid for the same hotel. The amount you or others have observed/paid in the past influences your reference price, which can be considered the basis to judge the deal you are offered.
Research over the last 30 years corroborates that reference points dramatically affect people's decisions. According to psychologists (Lewin et al., 1944; Siegel, 1957) , reference points are often defined as the decision maker's status quo or as an expectation. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) transferred the concept of reference dependence from psychology to behavioral economics, explaining that people frame outcomes as gains or losses relative to relevant reference points. The relevant literature examines the effect of reference points in the price domain, that is, on reference prices (Briesch et al., 1997; Mazumdar et al., 2005) , and the topic relates to research on new pricing mechanisms, such as bidding behavior (Wolk & Spann, 2008) and pay-what-you want pricing (Johnson & Cui, 2013) .
Two main conceptualization models are available on reference price. The most common is that reference prices are predictive price expectations. This model, named the expectation-based reference price, is derived from adaptation theory (Helson, 1964) and implies that people judge a stimulus in relation to the level to which they have adapted (Mazumdar et al., 2005) . In a second model, reference price is a normative price, that is, the price considered as fair for the seller to charge (Bolton et al., 2003; Campbell, 1999) . Both economic and social components have been shown to affect evaluations of price fairness. The conceptualization used generally depends on the market, customer group, and product/service involved.
The way people form their reference price becomes particularly relevant in contexts where favorable conditions for price discrimination occur, as consumers can easily pay a different price for the same product or service. Accordingly, price comparison is a consequence of dynamic pricing or price discrimination. Although several studies suggest that time-based pricing strategies tend to be accepted by consumers, price discrimination may be perceived as unfair if standard conventions are violated (Huang et al., 2005; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007) . Social comparison theory (Van den Bos et al., 1998) offers a potential underpinning for some of these results and highlights a possible threat for the acceptability of these pricing strategies. The awareness that another similar consumer paid a lower price appears to be a particularly potent source of perceived unfairness (Haws & Bearden, 2006 ), a factor that may reduce the reference price.
Research has not revealed a direct elicitation of reference prices in a time-based pricing context between different sources of information. Thus, our goal is to determine if the source of information of past prices, whether social (i.e., prices that friends or colleagues have paid for a similar product or service in the past) or anonymous (i.e., market prices the individual has observed in the past), can influence the formation of the reference price in its normative conceptualization. This study creates several scenarios where different prices for the same service (a hotel room reservation) become available, seeking to elicit the impact of past price information on reference prices. More precisely, Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinning of the research hypotheses. Section 3 then uses an experimental setting to investigate whether the same price sequence can produce a different reference price depending on the source of information (social or anonymous) and how individuals attribute weights to past information that can predict the reference price. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results and their managerial implications.
Background

Reference price and social comparison
All price evaluations evoke some form of comparative judgments (Xia et al., 2004) . This perspective relates to the general idea that much of people's understanding of themselves is not context-free but rather is based on similarities within their environment. People compare what others from a similar social group paid for the same service or product, especially when prices vary across consumers and lack transparency (Mezias et al., 2002) . This social comparison process is likely to substantially affect reference prices.
Social comparison is important for evaluating fairness as a means of distributive justice (Van den Bos et al., 1998) . Because it is difficult to gain an accurate appraisal by comparing dissimilar others, social comparison is largely directed towards a referent group (Festinger, 1954) . When people compare their outcomes with similar peers, shared attributes do not help them to make an evaluation. For this reason, people tend often to focus on information that supports the dissimilarities. In other words, people experience greater satisfaction from a purchase if they paid less than a peer. These concepts of downward social comparison and upward social comparison have solid roots. Wills (1981) introduced the concept of downward social comparison to identify situations where people look at others who are worse off to increase their own sense of well-being.
With respect to upward social comparison, people compare themselves with those who are better off so as to belong to a superior group (Collins, 1996) .
In contexts where social comparison is strong, the comparison of dissimilarities is amplified, thereby increasing sensitivity toward unfairness (Xia et al., 2004) and loss aversion (Kahneman et al., 2005) . Social justice literature also notes that the fairness of a process affects the way by which people self-evaluate (Brockner et al., 2003) . Among the three motives of self-evaluation (Sedikides, 1993) , two have been found to be particularly impactful when people look badly by social comparison. These two motives are self-enhancement (Wood, 1989) and self-assessment (Oliver & Swan, 1989) . In particular, Scholl et al. (1987) show how other's pay can be a relevant part of pay dissatisfaction, involving appraisals of inequity and injustice. Thus, even when a consumer pays the reference price, information that another customer paid less leads to perceptions of unfairness.
Other consumers' prices are generally considered an unequivocal standard for what focal consumers deserve to pay. Ashworth and McShane (2012) show that paying more than another consumer enhances reactions of unfairness by making the violation of what is deserved especially salient and disrespectful. In other words, paying more than a peer is interpreted as a personal affront.
Accordingly, comparisons with similar others are expected to produce lower reference prices, which leads to the following hypothesis:
H1. Comparisons with peers produce lower reference prices due to an increased sensitivity towards unfairness.
Reference price formation over time
In natural environments, purchasing decisions have a temporal dimension, which means individuals usually form their reference prices after observing sequences of prices (Bell & Lattin, 2000) . In other words, they collect different pieces of available information (Thaler, 1985) , which in our case originate from market prices observed in the past (anonymous source) or from prices actually paid by others belonging to the same social group (social source). It is then necessary to investigate the way the source of the information interacts with other factors that characterize the formation and updating of reference prices. Building on the previous literature, this article identifies some factors in sequences of past prices that can affect the current reference price. These factors include the first, the average and the last price seen; the highest and the lowest price; and the variability and trend of the sequence of prices.
First, average and last price. Dickson and Sawyer (1990) conducted a field study and found that the further in the past a certain price is, the less it contributes to the current reference price.
Therefore, reference prices are often represented as a decaying weighted average of all past prices.
The last price, as in Nasiry and Popescu (2011) , is assumed to be the most influential. Baucells et al. (2011) found that, in a financial setting, the first price has an important weight in the formation of reference prices. In their study, however, the first price was also the investor's purchasing price.
Highest and lowest price. Kahneman et al. (1993) were the first to introduce the magnitude of past peaks in the evaluation of a sequence. In consumer prices, while the lowest price seems to be an important cue for reference prices (Ackerman & Perner, 2004; Rajendran & Tellis, 1994) , high prices are also important because of loss aversion (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005) . Cowley (2008) shows that people tend to evaluate past experiences giving a retrospective evaluation from the proverbial "rose-colored" glass, thus suggesting good news. In this article, the presence of a low price paid for something in the past is given significantly more weight than personally irrelevant information.
The trend. Based on the order of the events in the timeline, the trend also influences the overall evaluation. In the financial context, Grant, Xie and Soman (2010) show that investors update reference points asymmetrically in that they more quickly adapt their reference points to good news, i.e., an increase in the value of a stock, and more slowly adapt to bad news. Baucells et al. (2011) , while they do not find evidence for asymmetry in the speed of adaptation, find instead an optimistic shift in expectations, which may explain why people are more easily disappointed than they are elated.
The variability. Related to the magnitude of prices, variability affects reference price.
Distributive justice and the principle of loss aversion play a role when differential prices or customer treatments are examined from the perspective of the consumer. This is even more relevant in the service industry where the use of dynamic pricing is intense. Although there is a smaller degree of perceived unfairness when the inequality is to the disadvantage of other consumers (Mayser & von Wangenheim, 2012) , consumers are hesitant to accept and absorb different prices.
For this reason, they lower their reference price (Drechsel & Natter, 2011) and then wait until the product or the service is found at the lowest price (Suk et al., 2012) . the social source of information should reduce reference prices because comparisons with similar others increase the importance of lowest prices from the perspective of the consumer. Indeed, the source of information may change the way people weigh past information.
Many authors have operationalized reference price as a weighted average of past prices (e.g., Nasiry & Popescu, 2011; Baucells et al., 2011) . This article builds on this literature by highlighting that in a social environment people mentally weigh previous information based on order of magnitude (from the lowest to the highest price information) rather than on order of time (from the first to the last information received).
H3. The relative importance of factors behind reference price formation differs depending on whether the source of information is anonymous or social.
H3a. In the presence of social comparison, forecasting models framed by magnitude rather than by timeline predict reference prices with greater accuracy.
H3b. In the presence of an anonymous source, forecasting models framed by timeline rather than by magnitude predict reference prices with greater accuracy.
Experimental study
Consider a consumer who observes a sequence of prices Pi, i = 1, …, n. She observes one unit of a product in period 1 at price Pi, thus forming an initial reference price. In the subsequent periods, she observes the other pieces of information and therefore has the opportunity to update the reference price.
While the majority of earlier studies infer reference price indirectly by observing choices, there is a recent tendency to elicit and measure the reference price directly. Different researchers adopt different conceptualizations, different measurement techniques and different interpretations of the reference price. Rajendran (2009) proposes a distinct operationalization of the reference price depending on whether its conceptualization is based on the notion of the expected price or the fair price. While the expected reference price is elicited as the "estimate of the likely price", the fair reference price is elicited as "a price above which it would be too high and below which it would be a good deal".
This article elicits reference prices within the fairness conceptualization of the reference price because, as shown by Rajendran (2009), consumers appear to be increasingly concerned with fairness and good value when reference prices are retrieved from past prices. Arkes et al. (2008) and Baucells et al. (2011) investigate changes in reference points using a similar fairness-based question. For this reason, in the experiments, participants have to state the price "fair for the reservation, meaning neither expensive nor cheap".
Aside from measuring the average impact of social comparison (H1), the study is designed to investigate the joint effect of the discussed explanatory factors in sequences of past prices (H2a and H2b). Furthermore, the study sheds light on how people mentally weigh previous prices depending on the source of information (H3, H3a and H3b).
Method
Participants
Participants in the study included 60 undergraduate students, 32 females and 28 males, from a course in business administration at Pompeu Fabra University who accepted an invitation to register for the experiment via e-mail. The average age of the participants was 21 years, and the range was from 20 to 26 years. Participants received a fixed payment of €5 for their participation.
Instructions and procedure
To conduct the experiment, the following situation was created. Participants were told that they would have to observe a sequence of prices charged by a unique hotel in a village; they were given no additional information. There was a four-second delay before each new price was added to the sequence from first price to last price. The length of each sequence of prices varied between 3 and 8 periods. The total number of sequences presented to participants was 120, and the order of the sequences presented was randomized.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two groups: an anonymous group and a social group. In the anonymous condition, participants were asked to imagine that the observed prices were prices found while surfing the Internet: The predesigned sequences (see Appendix) are plausible samples of the process described and were presented to the participants in random order. The variations within series are consistent with the use of dynamic pricing in the hoteling industry (Abrate et al., 2012) .
Before receiving the financial compensation, students were asked to indicate on a 1 to 5 scale whether the instructions were clear where 1 equals completely unclear and 5 equals completely clear. The average score across the 60 participants was 4.0. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that participants understood the presented procedure. The average processing time was 40 minutes.
Experimental Design
The experiment follows a mixed model design. The source of price information (social or anonymous) is investigated as a between-subjects variable, and participants were randomly split into one of the two conditions. As within-subjects variables, the experiment accounts for all timeline and magnitude factors discussed in Section 2.2; that is, the first, the average, the last, the highest and the lowest price as well as the trend and the variability. In principle, to disentangle the impact of each single within-subjects variable, one could design pairs of orthogonal sequences, i.e., pairs of identical sequences with respect to all studied factors but one. In this situation, however, some factors are partially overlapping. Specifically, it is not possible to design a pair of sequences perfectly orthogonal to the trend. If we fix the last price, then we must have two distinct first prices -see, for example, sequences 1-2 and 3-4 in the Appendix. If we fix the average, we must modify both the first and the last price -see sequences 13-14. Furthermore, by changing the lowest (or highest) price and maintaining a constant average, the standard deviation of the sequence also changes. This requires that we go beyond the strict comparison of pairs of sequences by exploring multiple factors simultaneously.
The final design consists of 120 price sequences, as shown in the Appendix. The sequences are divided into three homogeneous blocks of 40 sequences, and each of the 60 participants participates in one single block. Therefore, each participant sees 40 sequences presented in random order.
Empirical analysis
After considering the general difference between the anonymous and social conditions, the study estimates weighting regression models by sorting sequences according to timeline and magnitude. A Prelec weighting function (1998) then provides an integrated model to predict reference prices. This function investigates the effect of each piece of information when a new element in a sequence unfolds. Finally, the study investigates the predictive power of these different approaches by comparing them with the simple average of the sequence, a naïve method suggested as a benchmark in the forecasting literature (Armstrong, 2012) .
Weighting regression models
We explicitly separate the influence of the factors of timeline and magnitude, recognizing two alternative ways to sort price information:
-the first is to sort each sequence of n prices by timeline (T), thus keeping the price order as it was shown to participants, from the first to the last period: 1 , 2 , … , , … , -the second is to sort the same sequences by magnitude (M), rearranging the sequence of prices from the lowest ( 1 ) to the highest ( ), thus yielding the following order: 1 ,
, … , , … ,
In both cases -timeline and magnitude -reference price is a weighted average of past information, where, by construction, the sum of weights is equal to one and each price in the sequence ( in the case of magnitude) has a non-negative weight π (π ). Such weights can be estimated by means of linear regressions after imposing the proper theoretical constraints over the parameters, such that ∑ π , and the last (highest) price. This leads to two alternative models of reference price formation.
MODEL 1 (TIMELINE):
MODEL 2 (MAGNITUDE):
In addition, this study proposes a third parsimonious model that allows testing H2b. In model 3, the factors explaining reference price are the average (AVG), the price variability, which is Defining n as the length of the sequence, i as the position of the price in the sequence (i = 1, 2, …, n), either sorted by timeline or magnitude, and w as the cumulative weight attributed to all prices from 1 to i, the formal analytics are as follows:
The Prelec function [6] depends on two parameters. The first parameter, γ, controls for the curvature of the weights such that the lower the parameter, the greater the weight given to the extreme values, first and last in the timeline case and lowest and highest in the magnitude case. The second parameter, δ, controls for the elevation such that the lower the parameter, the greater the weight given to the first (lowest) price at the expense of the last (highest) price.
Using a two-step approach, the study first estimates equation 
Results
A first analysis measures the average impact across sequences of the source of information on the reference price (H1). If prices are presented as those paid in the past by colleagues/friends rather than as prices asked on an online booking system, then participants, on average, significantly lower their reference price, 117.39 versus 137.98, (t (1199) = 25.79, p < .001). As noted in the Appendix, this evidence extends to the vast majority of sequences analyzed (104 out of 120).
Tables 1a and 1b document the correlation matrix of the variables to be used in the regression models.
[ Table 1a and Table 1b here]
In both cases, the dependent variables (i.e., the reference prices in either the anonymous or the social condition) correlate with all the independent variables (timeline and magnitude factors). The average price highly correlates with both timeline and magnitude factors as well as with the intermediate values. First and last price highly correlate with trend (Table 1a) , while the magnitude factors, high and low prices, highly correlate with variability (Table 1b) . On the whole, the correlations tend to be consistent with the a priori models. Table 2 provides the results of all regressions for the two conditions, anonymous and social.
[ Table 2 here]
In the timeline model, the results are quite similar with respect to both the anonymous and the social conditions as the average of intermediate values is the most influential factor and the first price weighs slightly more than the last price. The latter result is coherent with the negative sign associated to trend in Model 3. The magnitude model highlights the difference between the anonymous and the social case. In the latter, the weight of the lowest price becomes dominant. The impact of magnitude factors is captured by the high effect of price variability in the mixed model, which lowers the reference price, but only in the social condition.
To test the predictive accuracy of the different models and, in turn, to highlight the predictive power of the different groups of factors the paper shows goodness of fit measures based on the Rsquare and the median error (Armstrong, 2012) . For each model, Table 2 provides the Median Absolute Percentage Error (MdAPE) along with the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD). In the anonymous case, a clear preference towards one model does not emerge. Moreover, none of the models proposed improves the performance of the naïve predictor (the average price of the sequence), which would produce the best fit of the reference price (MdAPE = 9.091, MAD = 6.039). On the contrary, the social case presents a vastly different picture. Here, the magnitude and the mixed models perform much better than the timeline model and also perform better with respect to the naïve predictor, whose results are quite poor (MdAPE = 17.647, MAD = 10.793).
[ Table 3 here] Finally, Table 3 reports the estimates of the Prelec model for the four analyzed cases. 2 It is important to highlight that whenever the constant of the linear regression is not significant and the slope (which determines the curvature) is equal to 1, then w(x)=x. This implies that each price in the sequence has the same proportional weight and the reference price is equivalent to the simple arithmetic mean. In the case of the anonymous group, both for the timeline and the magnitude model, we could not reject the hypotheses that = 0 and = 1. Therefore, in this case, the argument holds that reference price is the average of the price sequences, giving further support for the use of the naïve predictor. The same occurs in the social case when prices are sorted by timeline.
However, the study obtains significant estimates both for the constant (different from zero) and the slope (different from one) for the social case with prices sorted by magnitude. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the weighting function. The curvature indicates a predominant importance of extreme values, with the lowest price acting as the clear main driver of the reference point. With the same average but more pronounced extreme prices, the reference decreases because of the greater weight attributed to the lowest price. This result is coherent with the previous findings, thus highlighting the negative impact of variability (see Table 2 ). The Prelec function, which is based on only two parameters, allows for further improvement of the prediction accuracy with respect to Models 2 and 3 (MdAPE = 8.914, MAD = 5.658).
[ Figure 1 here]
Discussion
The most striking result is the dissimilarity of the average reference price in sequences that share the same elements but differ in the source of information, social versus anonymous.
Therefore, the main conclusion of the experiment is that when prices are social, reference prices are adjusted downward (H1).
The results regarding the factors guiding reference prices are more contradictory. On one hand, H2a receives little support given that models based on timeline factors do not perform better than the naïve predictor (the average price), while the magnitude models improve the accuracy of the reference prediction, but only in the social case. On the other hand, both trend and variability impact the reference price (H2b). However, only in the social case explicitly accounting for these factors can improve the predictive power of the model in comparison to the naïve predictor represented by the average price. In particular, in the social condition, the effect of past peaks is mediated by price variability that determines a strong reduction in the reference price. While Suk et al. (2012) highlighted that consumers are generally hesitant to accept variability in prices, this study defines the condition under which these results are strongly supported. This result also provides a first evidence for H3; that is, the source of information matters not only on the level of reference price but also on the level of the importance of the explanatory factors (in this case, the variability).
The regression findings along with the Prelec weighting function based on the magnitude of prices fully support H3a. In a service context with a social source of information, the predominant role of the lowest price, as well as the variability, is evident. People, aware of the presence of disadvantageous inequalities in their social environment, push for and expect to get something very close to the lowest price. Consumers' perceptions of fairness when forming a reference price in a social context are different with respect to the anonymous condition, thus moderating the goodness of models to predict the reference price. In the anonymous case, none of the proposed models improve reference prediction with respect to a simple heuristic based on the average price, and accordingly, H3b is not supported.
The Prelec approach allows for predicting reference prices with the lowest percentage error, while relying only on two parameters. Thus, results indicate that in a social context people tend to mentally order prices by magnitude and are less sensitive to the order in which these prices appeared on the timeline.
General conclusions
The experiment presented herein indicates that the source of information, social or anonymous, affects the formation of reference prices. This article builds on some studies regarding sequences (Ariely and Zauberman, 2000; Baucells et al., 2011) , controlling in addition for the presence of social influence. The evidence suggests that when a social influence is present, people lower their reference price, while if the source of information is anonymous, people are more inclined to average past prices. People tend not to place too much emphasis on the order in which prices appeared in time, but rather give more attention to the magnitude of these prices. These findings, however, seem to be a peculiarity of the service context given that in finance (Baucells et al., 2011), people are much more influenced by the order in which prices appeared in time.
In the social case, a two-parameter weighting function based on magnitude price sorting describes the reference price formation process. Our estimates show the importance of extreme rather than central values in the price sequence, as well as the predominant weight given to the lowest -and thus more favorable -price information.
Important managerial implications for marketers that charge different prices emerge from this study. The awareness of reference dependence may facilitate the understanding of online consumer behavior while shaping pricing and discounting policies (Kopalle et al., 1996) . If prices are maintained at an anonymous level, these findings suggest low prices and variability have limited influence on reference prices, thus somehow suggesting that revenue management and consumers now accept time-based pricing practices. Nonetheless boundary conditions apply in markets where social comparison is more intense because customers care about what others (from a referent group) are paying. The negative effect of social comparison on reference price highlights how preferential treatments given to some customers may induce an uneasy feeling, thereby leading to the perception of unfairness as well as the relative lowering of the reference price. Limiting the diffusion of such information, however, may not be feasible as consumers who are satisfied with their purchases tend to talk about the purchases (Brown et al. 2005 ) and share relevant information (Bickart & Schindler, 2001 ). Therefore, differences in prices must be transparent and rational. Marketers should combine price variations with customization or personalization as it will reduce comparability between transactions. Generally, it is important to separate consumers who pay less from those consumers who possess appropriate fencing conditions.
Observing sequences with extreme prices, people tend to punish for high prices (losses from a consumer perspective), giving strong weight to low prices in the determination of the reference price. This confirms one of the hypotheses from prospect theory: losses loom larger than gains. If the market consists only of loss-averse buyers and if comparisons with similar others are frequent, then the optimal strategy for firms would be to limit price variability.
The experiment involved student participants and service purchase scenarios. We are aware that presenting student participants with a hypothetical design in a lab is less than ideal. For this reason, we acknowledge that the size of these effects could be biased, and therefore, the results should be independently replicated before jumping to conclusions. Nonetheless, methodological concerns regarding the hypothetical design would, in principle, only weaken the size of the effects, while the impact of dynamic pricing may be even more pronounced when varying prices are encountered in realistic shopping online environments under conditions of higher involvement.
In the presented experiment, the past information was available on the screen. The highly weighted results of the first prices could be explained by the fact that "participants may not have clear preferences about the value of a product and rely on past prices to provide an indication of what such value is" (Sitzia & Zizzo, 2012 Future research should explore whether different price situations or different sources of social information, i.e., people higher or lower in a social rank, generate a divergent effect on reference price. The closeness of the relationship with comparison consumers should increase the sensitivity of the source of information on the reference price, thus affecting judgment regarding fairness. 
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